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Resumo 
 
Esta dissertação visa verificar, seguindo os mesmos processos apresentados por 
Sunderam (2015), se as operações de recompra, o activo de curto-prazo mais usado pela 
banca sombra como fonte de financiamento, oferecem serviços monetários; isto é, têm 
liquidez e segurança suficientes para poderem servir como reserva de valor. Analisando 
o período entre julho de 2001 e agosto de 2008, é possível encontrar sinais positivos de 
que tal se verifica, embora não seja possível apresentar uma resposta definitiva. 
 
Códigos-JEL: E41, E44, G23 
Palavras-chave: banca sombra, repo, oferta monetária, serviços monetários 
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Abstract 
 
Following the same procedures presented in Sunderam (2015), I test whether 
repos, the most common short-term source of financing used by the European Shadow 
Banking Sector, offered money-like services. The predictions provided by his model 
present favourable empirical results in the euro area.  
 
JEL-codes: E41, E44, G23 
Key-words: shadow banking, repurchase agreements, money-like services, 
money supply 
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Introduction 
 
Does the European Shadow Banking‟s short term debt offer money services? 
Following the procedures presented by Sunderam (2015), I test if the author‟s 
conclusions are also valid for the euro area, by checking if shadow banking debt 
behaves as a substitute for other claims that are safe, liquid and able to store value 
effectively: government debt bills and bank deposits. 
The Shadow Banking system “consists of a web of specialized financial 
institutions that conduct credit, maturity and liquidity transformation without direct, 
explicit access to public backstops” (Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012, 10). According to 
Bouveret (2011), repurchase agreements (repo) were the dominant instrument used by 
this system to fund itself, surpassing Asset-backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) in the 
euro area. They are the “type of transaction in which a money market participant 
acquires immediately available funds by selling securities and simultaneously agreeing 
to repurchase the same or similar securities after a specified time at a given price, which 
typically includes interest at an agreed-upon rate. Such a transaction is called repo when 
viewed from the perspective of the supplier of the securities (the party acquiring funds) 
and a reverse repo or matched sale-purchase agreement when described from the point 
of view of the supplier of funds” (Lumpkin, 1998, 59). While it would be easier to keep 
using ABCP like Sunderam, replacing it with repo brings the analysis closer to the 
European reality. This work is the first to simultaneously use this analysis on this 
economic area and to focus on repo rather than ABCP, despite the challenges obtaining 
data. 
Sunderam‟s model generates five predictions that he later confronts with the 
US„s data. After the relevant adaptations to the euro area, they are the following:  
 
1- Low yields on Treasury bills should forecast an increase of repo activity by 
the Shadow Banking System: high demand for Treasury bills should make 
substitutes also more attractive. 
2- Treasury bill issuance and repo activity should be negatively correlated: 
increasing the quantity of an asset crowds out the demand for its substitutes. 
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3- Shorter maturity repo should respond more strongly to Treasury bill yields: 
they should be safer and more liquid and thus be a closer substitute to 
Treasury bills. 
4- Low Treasury bill yields should forecast increases in the supply of reserves 
by the Central Bank: the increasing money demand will impact deposits 
demand, which in turn require reserves. To keep the rate at its target, new 
reserves need to be injected to counter the increased demand. 
5- The interbank funding rate should be high when Treasury bill yields are low, 
unless the rate is perfectly stabilized: the increased demand for deposits will 
drive banks‟ demand for reserves in the interbank market, raising prices.  
 
These predictions stem from the fact that T-bills, deposits and repo all provide 
money services and are imperfect substitutes of one another. Thus, the demand for 
money-like claim is linked with the remaining claims. 
The dataset starts at July, 2001 and ends at August 2008, running in a monthly 
frequency. The EONIA, MRO rates and outstanding repo time series were obtained at 
the ECB; Thomson Reuters provided the time series for the Overnight Indexed Swaps, 
German 3 Month Yields and mandatory reserves at the central bank. The predictions 
were verified statistically, connecting the growth of money-like claims with the growth 
of repurchase agreements and deposits, leaving only Treasury bills unchecked. 
Literature Review The literature on Shadow Banking focuses on the factors 
that explain its development and growth. These factors can be grouped into three 
categories: “innovation in the composition of aggregate money supply, capital, tax and 
accounting arbitrage and finally, other agency problems in financial markets” (Adrian 
and Ashcraft, 2012, 10). 
Firstly, the “innovation in the composition of aggregate money supply” category 
considers the possibility of shadow banking short-term liabilities being able to offer 
“money services”: being considered safe and liquid enough to be used as a store of 
value (Sunderam, 2015). My work fits into this category. Since liquidity is a pre-
requisite for supplying money services, this field touches the literature on liquidity, such 
as Holmström and Tirole (1998). If Shadow Banking Debt provides money-like services 
(which include liquidity), it will be part of the private suppliers of liquid claims. If this 
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sector increases in size, then liquidity shocks will be more severe and demand greater 
efforts by the public sector to cover for private supply‟s shortcomings. 
Secondly, the “capital, tax and accounting arbitrage” category focuses on the 
role of regulation and policymaking as catalysts for the growth of the Shadow Banking 
sector. Friedman (2009) considers that the sector developed as a response to an over-
complicated web of regulations that fostered securitization activities. Acemoglu (2009) 
in turn believes that regulations were insufficient or ineffective. Levitin and Wachter 
(2012) defend the shift from regulated securitization to unregulated securitization as the 
main factor behind the severity of the American Housing Bubble of 2004-2007. 
Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2013) link the changes made to regulatory capital rules to 
the rapid growth of ABCP activity, which was used to finance American Shadow 
Banking activity. 
Finally, the “other agency problems in financial markets” category highlights 
information asymmetry issues in the securitization market, along its value chain. In 
particular, Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) describe the issues between the several 
agents in the market, namely lenders, originators, investors, servicers, borrowers, 
beneficiaries of invested funds, asset managers and credit rating agencies. Another 
interesting perspective is provided by Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2009): given the 
reliance on ratings provided by Credit Rating Agencies, is their reputation alone 
sufficient to discipline the agencies themselves? Errors in their evaluation affect the 
entire system and conflicting interests are known to exist. 
The literature on the topic is still in its infancy and focuses on the American 
crisis and the housing bubble that preceded it. In Europe, Bakk-Simon et al. (2012) 
provide an extensive overview of Shadow Banking in Europe. However, the literature 
focusing on the euro area is thin; this work intends to provide a humble step in that 
direction. 
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Chapter 1. Sunderam’s Model 
 
Sunderam‟s (2015) model admits three categories of agents, all risk neutral for 
simplicity: households (including firms), banks (both traditional sector and shadow 
sector) and the monetary authority. 
 
1.1 . Households and Demand 
 
Households demand money-like services: safety, liquidity, a store of value and, 
in the case of deposits, transaction services. Sunderam (2015) admits three types of 
claims that can provide any of the money-like services previously mentioned: deposits, 
Treasury bills and Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP). However, he also admits 
that each of the claims provides different amounts of those services, due to their 
different nature. The quantity provided by deposits for each monetary unit invested is 
normalized to 1 (  ), while the quantity provided by the other claims (   and      ) is 
lower but still positive 
 
                     . 
 
Households try to maximize the effective amount of money-like services given 
by these claims together, taking into consideration the amount invested into each one. It 
is assumed that the elasticity of substitution between them is constant. This results in 
the following equation: 
 
  (  
   
      
   
            
   
 )
 
   
, 
 
 
where M is the total money-like services provided to households,               
are the amounts of deposits, Treasury bills and ABCP (respectively) expressed in 
monetary units and   is the elasticity of substitution between deposits, Treasury Bills 
and ABCP. In accordance to Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), Sunderam 
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(2015) assumes “that households maximize  [∑    ], where         ( ).  ( ) 
is a reduced-form function for the utility from consuming total money-like services M, 
and     is a money demand shifter – a notational device that allows us to examine the 
effects of an increase in demand for all money-like claims simply by taking 
comparative statics with respect to  ” (Sunderam, 2015, 943). Following this utility 
specification, households require gross returns 
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for deposits (  ), Treasury Bills (  ), ABCP (     ) and non-money-like claims ( ). 
Note that the return for these money-like claims is lower than the return for non-money-
like claims since they provide utility to households beyond the return they provide. The 
difference between the non-money-like claim‟s return   and each of the returns for 
money-like claims   ,    and       is the corresponding claim‟s money premium. 
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1.2 . Supply of claims 
 
Looking now at the supply of claims, they are produced by the government 
(Treasury bills) and by banks (deposits and ABCP). Sunderam (2015) assumes that the 
supply of Treasury bills is exogenous, that there is a continuum of banks of size one and 
that they take the aggregate supply of money-like services and prices of the claims as 
given. Banks can have two categories of assets: reserves, which provide no return, and 
projects, which are expected to return F>R. Their liabilities can be long-term bonds, 
Deposits and ABCP, which serve as their external sources of financing. Due to the 
small weight of capital, it is excluded from the figure. In the short run, banks are 
assumed to be unable to expand their balance sheets, so they can simply change the 
composition of their financial structure. In the following figure, 1 represents total 
liabilities (or total assets), and each symbol represents the corresponding weight in the 
balance sheet for each claim. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Balance Sheet Composition. Source: Sunderam (2015) 
 
Long-term bonds require gross return R. ABCP requires R minus their money 
premium but comes with a private issuing cost. Deposits require reserves as a 
precaution against withdrawals, which present an opportunity cost. They are also in 
fixed supply, so they need to be purchased in the interbank market. The central bank 
sets the quantity of available reserves in order to bring the interbank market rate as close 
as possible to its intended target. 
The characteristics listed above determine supply and now banks try to 
maximize their returns by changing the weight of each element in their balance sheet, 
under the previous constraints. Their choices will have an impact on yields and 
premiums, feeding a process of fine-tuning. 
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1.3 . Predictions 
 
After describing the model and its agents, the relevant conclusions that it 
provides will now be summarized, expressing the expected behavior in the data. These 
are all presented by Sunderam (2015); I merely list them here and present the 
adaptations necessary to the new economic environment. These changes result from 
different reference rates (since the responsible institution is now the European Central 
Bank instead of the Federal Reserve) and from the predominant use of a different 
instrument by the European Shadow Banking, repo. Both represent short-term loans 
with requiring, by definition, collateral and their markets were widely used to fund the 
Shadow Banking sector, though their importance varies geographically. When 
considering repo activity, the work excludes  
The author assumes two sources of exogenous variation: variation in overall 
money demand and in the supply of Treasury Bills. The predictions generated are the 
following: 
 
Prediction 1: Low yields (high prices) on Treasury bills should forecast an 
increase of repo activity by the Shadow Banking system. 
 
An increase in money demand   results in high prices for money-like services, 
which in the model consist in Treasury bills, deposits and repo. The high demand thus 
lowers yields for Treasury bills. To respond to higher money demand, the banking 
system will be interested in offering more repo, to capture the higher money premium, 
or in other words, capture the higher discount in return required by households, in 
comparison to non-money-like claims. Offering more repo will lower costs for banks. 
 
Prediction 2: Treasury bill issuance and repo activity should be negatively 
correlated. 
 
Since Treasury bills and repo are imperfect substitutes, issuing more of either of 
them will crowd out the demand for the other. Another way to explain this prediction is 
to look at Prediction 1: if Treasury bill issuance is increased, prices will decrease, 
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reducing the repo money premium available to be captured. Therefore, banks save less 
on costs by offering more repo. Increased Treasury bill issuance “crowded out” repo 
activity. 
 
Prediction 3: Shorter maturity repo should respond more strongly to 
Treasury bill yields. 
 
Shorter maturity repo should provide more money-like services than longer term 
repo. As a result, the first will be a closer substitute to Treasury bills and thus react 
more strongly to changes in their yields. 
 
Prediction 4: Low Treasury bill yields should forecast increases in the 
supply of reserves by the Central Bank. 
 
If Treasury bill yields are low, their price is high. As a result, household demand 
will drift to the other two money-like claims, deposits and repo. The increased amount 
of deposits will require the bank to buy additional reserves in the interbank market, 
driving the rate upwards. The central bank will increase the supply of reserves in order 
to push the rate back to its target. 
 
Prediction 5: The interbank funding rate should be high when Treasury bill 
yields are low, unless the rate is perfectly stabilized. 
 
When investors are highly interested in liquidity, government bills, deposits and 
shadow bank debt should also be in high demand. Increased demand for deposits 
increases the demand for reserves leading to an increase in the interbank rate for 
reserves. In the model, the dynamic does not apply if the rate is perfectly stabilized, 
though in reality, exogenous shocks make such result practically impossible to obtain. 
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These conclusions describe the expected behaviour if these assets are substitutes 
in the “money-like” claims market1. The following step is to take these predictions and 
face them against the available data. 
  
                                                        
1
 Sunderam (2015) also considers the possibility that at high frequencies, writing repo contracts, simply 
cover banks‟ need for financing at high frequencies. In that case, since they do not provide money-like 
services, no linkages should arise between these markets and the markets for Treasury bills and reserves. 
Under this possibility, verifying the predictions with the data will not yield any results. Obtaining 
statistically significant linkages rules out this possibility. 
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Chapter  2. Data, Models and Results 
 
2.1. Data 
 
The time series used span from July, 2001 until August, 2008, at a monthly 
frequency
2
. In order to obtain as many observations as possible, the time period under 
analysis ends in the month before the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. 
 
 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1 summarizes the variables in our data. The variables G3MYOISspread, 
ECBspread and G3MYOISlag, expressed in percentages, have very small values for the 
mean and the standard deviation. This posed a problem, as there were small changes in 
values to be explained. 
G3MYOISspread consists in the difference between the German 3 Month Yield 
and the 3 Month Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS), both obtained from Thomson Reuters 
through Datastream. Reserves reflect the ECB‟s current accounts, which include 
mandatory and precautionary reserves deposited by euro area banking institutions, also 
accessed from Datastream. Repo represents the amounts of repo operations outstanding 
in the euro area, expressed in million euros, obtained from the Statistical Data 
Warehouse. Operations between the central government (Sovereign States, Central 
Banks) and the euro area are not included. M1, M2 and M3 refer to the similar money 
                                                        
2 The initial goal was to obtain data with a similar time span and frequency as those present in Sunderam 
(2015) to make the results as comparable as possible. Due to data availability constraints, data was 
instead obtained at the next shortest frequency, monthly. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
G3MYOISspread 86 .0039884 .0907756 -.2065 .149
Reserves 86 149246.3 24315.64 89431 211037
Repo 86 247650.8 32932.76 213584 336740
M1 86 3058557 590691.4 2158212 3863054
M2 86 5843197 970886.6 4481450 7786652
M3 86 6842742 1143185 5214748 9143427
ECBspread 86 .0643035 .0890479 -.2635 .3445
G3MYOISlag 85 .0032 .0910177 -.2065 .149
 
 
 11 
aggregates. ECBspread is the difference between the EONIA and the Main Refinancing 
Operations rate, obtained at the ECB‟s Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW).  
The G3MYOISspread variable provides a proxy for the yield for money-like 
services. The German 3 Month yield incorporates the effects of short-term interest rates, 
as well as credit risk and liquidity premia. Overnight Indexed Swaps “carry little risk 
and are a good proxy for risk-free rates purged of liquidity and credit risk premia” 
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Duffie and Choudhry, 2011; Feldhutter and Lando, 2008; Gorton 
and Metrick, 2010a; Schwarz, 2010; in Sunderam, 2015, 953). The OIS thus serves as 
an indictation of the overall level of short-term interest rates. Using the spread between 
Treasury bills and OIS “essentially strips out variation in the Treasury bill yield driven 
by changes in the overall level of short-term interest rates” (Sunderam, 2015, 953) thus 
capturing the information about the money premium that is embedded in Treasury bill 
yields. 
 
2.2. Models and Results 
 
The work now tests the predictions 1-5 presented previously, accompanied by 
the corresponding model used for each prediction. 
 
2.2.1. Prediction 1: Low yields on Treasury bills should forecast 
an increase of repo activity by the Shadow Banking 
System. 
 
In order to test this prediction, the following model was estimated: 
 
   (     )      (                )     
 
Repo is a time series with the outstanding amounts of repurchase agreements in 
the euro area for period t. G3MYOISlag is equal to the G3MYOISspread but lagged one 
period. Ln represents the natural logarithm,   and   are the coefficients to be estimated 
and    the error terms. 
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Figure 2 – Evolution of Repo. Source: ECB  
 
            
Figure 3 – Evolution of the spread between the German 3 Month Yield, 3 Month 
OIS. Source: Thomson Reuters 
Looking at figure 2 and 3, it is observable a break in the overall evolution of 
each variable at the second semester of 2005: in figure 2, it is observable a big decrease 
in the spread, signalling a big increase in the price of Treasury bills not related with 
changes in short-term interest rates; in figure 3, an acceleration of repo activity is 
observable at the same moment. This behaviour is in accordance to what the model 
presented by Sunderam (2015) suggests. 
 
The results of the regression are as follows: 
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Table 2 – Results for the First Prediction. Values in parenthesis indicate the 
corresponding t-statistic. All coefficients are significant at a 5% level. 
 
The estimation resulted from a least squares estimation with Newey-West 
standard errors to address autocorrelation issues. The coefficient regarding 
G3MYOISlag, our money premium proxy lagged one time period, is significant at 5% 
and has the expected signal. It is, however, economically small. In this case, it suggests 
that an increase in the G3MYOISspread of one percentage point leads to a decrease in 
repo activity of approximately 2.5% in the next time period. 
  
Regression with Newey-West standard errors
Constant G3MYOISlag
VarLnRepo .0022203 -.0253641
(3.35) (-3.46)
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2.2.2. Prediction 4: Low Treasury bill yields should forecast 
increases in the supply of reserves by the Central Bank. 
 
The following expression will be used to put the prediction to the test: 
 
   (         )      (                )     
 
Reserves are given by a time series with the ECB‟s current accounts, which in 
turn contains mandatory and precautionary reserves from banks in the Eurosystem, held 
by the central bank. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Evolution of Reserves. Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
Reserves have also been growing, with the same trend as Repo. The year 2005 
continues to mark the change from an almost stationary tendency to a growing one. 
For this regression, a change in methodology was required. The presence of 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity required the use of an Auto-regressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model. This procedure assumes that the variance 
of the error terms for a given observation can be written as a function of the variance of 
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the error terms of previous observations, plus white noise. More information can be 
found on manuals such as Asteriou and Hall (2011). 
For the following test, the variance for each observation is given by a function 
containing the variance of the immediately previous one, ARCH (1). 
 
 
Table 3 – Results for the Fourth Prediction. Values in parenthesis correspond to 
the z-statistic. The intercept is not significant. The spread’s coefficient is 
significant at a 5% level. 
 
Again, similar to the prediction in 2.2.1., the coefficient for G3MYOISlag has 
the expected signal and is statistically significant at 5% level, in line with the model. An 
increase of one percentage point in the gap leads to a decrease of 5.6856% in the 
reserves held. 
 
 
2.2.3. Prediction 5: The interbank funding rate should be high 
when Treasury bill yields are low, unless the rate is 
perfectly stabilized. 
 
For the relation between the interbank funding rate and the Treasury bill yields, 
the corresponding expression is the following: 
 
 (              )       (          )     
 
The EONIA rate reflects the price for overnight reserve transactions between 
banks. The Main Refinancing Operations rate (MROrate) provides a signal to the 
market, being thus a transmission channel for the central bank‟s monetary policy, 
ARCH family regression
Constant G3MYOISlag
VarLnReserves  -.0027855  -.0585362
(-1.09) (-2.08)
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according to the ECB (2011). The difference between the two results is what is labelled 
as the ECBspread. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Evolution of the ECBspread. Source: ECB 
 
While the series presents a stable trend, it is more volatile than the German 
Yield-OIS spread. Two periods of higher volatility stand out: from the beginning of the 
sample until 2004 and from 2006 onwards. 
Similar to the test of prediction 4, an ARCH model was used to solve 
heteroskedasticity issues. The results were the following: 
 
 
Table 4 – Results for the Fifth Prediction. Values in parenthesis indicate the z-
statistic. The intercept is not significant. The spread’s coefficient is significant at a 
5% level. 
 
ARCH family regression
Constant ECBspread
G3MYOISspread   .0676415   -.1690502
(11.17) (-2.66)
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Again, the results are statistically significant at a 5% level and the relationship 
between the variables has the expected signal: as Treasury bill yields decrease, the 
interbank market rate increases, after taking into account the effects of short-term rates 
and central bank injection rate.  
 
 
2.2.4. Testing the Treasury bill yield OIS spread as a proxy for 
money demand 
 
As a final step, I test the German Yield-OIS gap as a tool to detect money 
demand shocks, following the procedure done by Sunderam (2015). If it truly behaves 
in accordance to money demand, “increases in demand should raise prices and 
quantities” (Sunderam, 2015, 963). Therefore, it will be presented the three main money 
aggregates and test the correlation between each of them and our variable. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Evolution of the money aggregates. Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
It can be seen from the first of the three figures that, while M1 has a linear trend, 
it suffers a big increase in its value in the second semester of 2005, with a slowdown 
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from 2007 onwards. The other two aggregates, M2 and M3, present an increase in the 
pace of their growth from the second half of 2005, although a far more subtle one. 
The model to be estimated is presented next: 
 
  (  )      (              )     
 
  represents the different money aggregates,   standing for time. The results for 
the estimations, with the same ARCH procedure, are the following: 
 
 
Table 5 – Results of the regression with the money aggregates. Values in 
parenthesis indicate the corresponding z-statistic. All coefficients are significant at 
a 1% level. 
 
For each case, the coefficients regarding our proxy for money demand are 
statistically significant for a 95% level of confidence. They also show that, as expected, 
when yields for liquidity fall (prices rise), the money aggregates grow as well. The 
relationship is stronger with the most restrictive group M1: the corresponding elements 
possess greater liquidity, safety and capability as a store of value. Therefore, they 
should provide more money-like services, which explains their stronger relationship. 
Concluding, the gap in question is indeed an adequate proxy for shocks in 
money demand, strengthening the results previously obtained and presented. 
  
ARCH family regression
Constant G3MYOISspread
LnM1         14.91055  -1.178178
(3359.28) (-34.60)
LnM2         15.55777   -.9200249
(2443.52) (-16.13)
LnM3         15.71484  -.8961188
(2459.80) (-18.07)
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Conclusions 
 
This work provides evidence that shadow banking debt provides money-like 
services. The end goal was to relate the growth of money demand with the growth of 
shadow banking activity. While I was unable to provide enough evidence for a 
definitive answer, they do provide signals that, indeed short-term shadow debt provides 
money-like services, which would help explain the sector‟s pre-crisis growth. 
Inspired by Sunderam (2015), I was able to test the proxy for money demand 
and link it to the time series for repo activity, the predominant short-term source of 
funding of this sector in the euro area. I was also able to link it to the amounts held as 
reserves at the ECB, as a requirement for deposits held by banks. Finally, I confirmed 
the connection between money demand with the interbank market for reserves, taking 
into account the cost for new reserves issued by the central bank. These links are 
statistically significant. 
The first problem was the inability to link the shadow debt to treasury bills as 
substitutes due to the lack of data regarding their outstanding amounts. This was also 
true when trying to prove the effect of shadow debt's maturity in its capability of 
providing money-like services. As a result, since these two final connections were not 
tested, I cannot state irrefutably that the European Shadow Banking sector created 
money-like claims and that these were the force behind their growth until the recent 
crisis. 
Increased availability of data would be greatly appreciated for future academic 
works since it would allow new venues for investigation, as well as ease hypothesis 
testing. Also, new and different model specifications could provide interesting insights: 
the data for several variables suggested two different "states": prior 2005 and after. A 
Structural Break model could thus provide evidence on different "states", though it 
would be more interesting with a larger period to be analysed. 
As Bakk-Simon et al. (2012) showed, the shadow banking activity did not fall 
nearly as much in Europe as in the American case, showing even signs of a recovery. 
The aim of this work was to provide insights into the expected behaviour of the Shadow 
Banking activity. It would benefit monetary policy to have a better understanding of the 
sector in order to improve the quality and precision of future monetary analysis and 
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interventions. It is expected that this topic will fuel more discussion and analysis in the 
future which, looking at the effects of the latest crisis in the economy, will be greatly 
welcomed so as to prevent similar developments in the future. 
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